To whom it may concern:
College is starting up for me again now and I will be a lot more busy. I will hope to keep posting, but I probably can't keep up with that and all the comments as well. I'm just letting you know that I find the current discussion interesting and you are more than welcome to continue this discussion here.
Thank you,
Micah
Saturday, August 26, 2006
Thursday, August 17, 2006
Existentialism
Existentialism is in many ways a difficult philosophical position to evaluate, because it is only by some stretch of the imagination that we can call it a "position." I think it would be better to think of existentialism as a philosophical attitude or way-of-thinking, of which a particular assortment of philosophical positions are characteristic. For this reason, it becomes difficult to either applaud or denounce existentialism as a whole, because it is not by its nature so unified as to justify such generalizations. I feel that it is better evaluate some of its typical components piece by piece. Specifically, I intend to evaluate the relations between existentialism and a Christian worldview.
Existentialism centers around the idea that there are two spheres of reality: the external, objective sphere comprising the physical universe, and the internal, subjective sphere which is the domain of the human will and individual experience. External reality is absurd; it is nothing more than the random happenings of a mindless universe, and it can offer us no source of meaning. That can only be found within: we must create meaning and values ourselves through individual acts of will.
From a purely objective standpoint, several difficulties appear with this position. The first is that unless our philosophy contains an absurd degree of idealism, we must suppose that we are derived from the larger scope of existence outside of ourselves, and not the other way around. In this way, the fact that we have the faculties of will and experience are themselves absurdities if the universe in which we live is devoid of them. In this way, existentialism is ultimately a philosophy of denial: we can see rationally that a purely materialistic universe is empty and meaningless, and so we say "lets just ignore that fact and go on assuming that our consciousness has meaning."
Yet this statement is certainly not unjustified. The statement that our experience as humans is meaningful, can, in my opinion, stand as a worthwhile proposition on its own independently of external proof, in the same manner that we make other observations about existence, like tree bark is rough and 2+3=5. It is certainly no more irrational to argue that existence as a whole has meaning because we experience it than it is to say that existence apparently has no meaning, so our individual experience must, in fact, be meaningless. Both are correct conclusions of their respective premises; it is these premises themselves that must be subject to our evaluations. But that, of course, is another issue that will perhaps be dealt with at another time. The point is that the contention of existentialism does not have this logical consistency: it states that the universe that gave us being is absurd, and then goes on to say that we ourselves are not absurd. I cannot see where genuine meaning and rationality can arise on their own out of indifference and absurdity. In this way existentialism says "well, it really doesn’t make sense, but this is just how it is, and we’ll have to deal with it as best we can."
The other difficulty is that of creating values. Once again, this seems to thrust existential thinking into an exercise in make-believe. It is certainly true that we can choose to value things, or regard them as good. But we cannot make things valuable, or inherently worthy of being viewed as good. We can create values, but not value. If such were not the case, and we were capable of making things good by our own will, it would be most rational to call anything the outcome of which is beyond our control "good’, for this would make there be the most possible good in the world. So when a tsunami strikes and millions die, it would be up to us to make there be more good in the world and decide that this occurrence was "good." The fact that we would inevitably not choose this to be a value in preference for things like life and health and well-being suggests that these are valuable by themselves independently of our valuing them.
Both of these objections contrast starkly with a Christian worldview. First of all, in a Christian worldview, external, objective reality is not absurd; it is the meaningful work of a transcendently conscious Being. Therefore, the fact that we can have meaningful experience in life is not difficult to reconcile with the reality we perceive beyond our own existence; there is a clear source of meaning and value in life. Secondly, we cannot say that we create our own value, not only because the very idea of actually doing so is absurd, but that value has already been created and is an integral part of created existence, and it is the role of our free will to allow this value to become our values, and thus be conformed to what we were made to be.
However, much of existential thought has worthwhile relevance to a Christian worldview. There are three areas here that I would like to discus. The first is what Kierkegaard referred to as the individual relation to the absolute. In many ways, it is a fair assessment that western Christianity is too individualist already. However, if this is not understood to mean an attitude of personal independence or the lack of duty to those around us, it has tremendous importance that is often missed: the fact that our ultimate purpose as beings is to make individual acts of will that glorify God by choosing a relationship with Him, choosing His moral law, choosing to rely on the righteousness and death of Christ rather than our own flawed righteousness of our own making. This is, I believe, the sense in which we are commanded above all things to love the Lord our God with all our heart, soul, mind and strength: this is the individual relation to the absolute.
The second existential concept that fits in well with a Christian worldview is the fact that we have an ultimate duty to ourselves. That sounds very anti-Christian, and in fact, it is. I must qualify it by saying that we rather have an ultimate duty to what we are as beings, no matter what we regard as the source of our being-hood. Therefore, this concept must be a part of any belief system. For the Christian, it is important to recognize that we have a duty to God because of what we are: His creatures, made to live and act and choose according to His design for us. In order to see that something is good, we must see how it is good for us: not necessarily in a hedonistic sense, but by the sense in which our own existence and experience must itself have moral value in order for our choices regarding God’s created order to have real moral value in terms of our relation to it. This only illustrates more strongly the concept of our individual relation to the absolute, and our beautiful duty to a magnificent and holy, and loving God.
The last existential concept that has relevance in a Christian worldview which I would like to discuss is the movement of faith which Kierkegaard also discusses. In a universe which is, though not absurd, often outside of our complete understanding, we must make choices with best that we have. We do not create values by making these choices, but we do affirm them. By making the movement of faith in God and Jesus Christ, we show our belief in Him and our love by the internal movement we have made, which necessarily becomes manifest in our external actions.
Existentialism centers around the idea that there are two spheres of reality: the external, objective sphere comprising the physical universe, and the internal, subjective sphere which is the domain of the human will and individual experience. External reality is absurd; it is nothing more than the random happenings of a mindless universe, and it can offer us no source of meaning. That can only be found within: we must create meaning and values ourselves through individual acts of will.
From a purely objective standpoint, several difficulties appear with this position. The first is that unless our philosophy contains an absurd degree of idealism, we must suppose that we are derived from the larger scope of existence outside of ourselves, and not the other way around. In this way, the fact that we have the faculties of will and experience are themselves absurdities if the universe in which we live is devoid of them. In this way, existentialism is ultimately a philosophy of denial: we can see rationally that a purely materialistic universe is empty and meaningless, and so we say "lets just ignore that fact and go on assuming that our consciousness has meaning."
Yet this statement is certainly not unjustified. The statement that our experience as humans is meaningful, can, in my opinion, stand as a worthwhile proposition on its own independently of external proof, in the same manner that we make other observations about existence, like tree bark is rough and 2+3=5. It is certainly no more irrational to argue that existence as a whole has meaning because we experience it than it is to say that existence apparently has no meaning, so our individual experience must, in fact, be meaningless. Both are correct conclusions of their respective premises; it is these premises themselves that must be subject to our evaluations. But that, of course, is another issue that will perhaps be dealt with at another time. The point is that the contention of existentialism does not have this logical consistency: it states that the universe that gave us being is absurd, and then goes on to say that we ourselves are not absurd. I cannot see where genuine meaning and rationality can arise on their own out of indifference and absurdity. In this way existentialism says "well, it really doesn’t make sense, but this is just how it is, and we’ll have to deal with it as best we can."
The other difficulty is that of creating values. Once again, this seems to thrust existential thinking into an exercise in make-believe. It is certainly true that we can choose to value things, or regard them as good. But we cannot make things valuable, or inherently worthy of being viewed as good. We can create values, but not value. If such were not the case, and we were capable of making things good by our own will, it would be most rational to call anything the outcome of which is beyond our control "good’, for this would make there be the most possible good in the world. So when a tsunami strikes and millions die, it would be up to us to make there be more good in the world and decide that this occurrence was "good." The fact that we would inevitably not choose this to be a value in preference for things like life and health and well-being suggests that these are valuable by themselves independently of our valuing them.
Both of these objections contrast starkly with a Christian worldview. First of all, in a Christian worldview, external, objective reality is not absurd; it is the meaningful work of a transcendently conscious Being. Therefore, the fact that we can have meaningful experience in life is not difficult to reconcile with the reality we perceive beyond our own existence; there is a clear source of meaning and value in life. Secondly, we cannot say that we create our own value, not only because the very idea of actually doing so is absurd, but that value has already been created and is an integral part of created existence, and it is the role of our free will to allow this value to become our values, and thus be conformed to what we were made to be.
However, much of existential thought has worthwhile relevance to a Christian worldview. There are three areas here that I would like to discus. The first is what Kierkegaard referred to as the individual relation to the absolute. In many ways, it is a fair assessment that western Christianity is too individualist already. However, if this is not understood to mean an attitude of personal independence or the lack of duty to those around us, it has tremendous importance that is often missed: the fact that our ultimate purpose as beings is to make individual acts of will that glorify God by choosing a relationship with Him, choosing His moral law, choosing to rely on the righteousness and death of Christ rather than our own flawed righteousness of our own making. This is, I believe, the sense in which we are commanded above all things to love the Lord our God with all our heart, soul, mind and strength: this is the individual relation to the absolute.
The second existential concept that fits in well with a Christian worldview is the fact that we have an ultimate duty to ourselves. That sounds very anti-Christian, and in fact, it is. I must qualify it by saying that we rather have an ultimate duty to what we are as beings, no matter what we regard as the source of our being-hood. Therefore, this concept must be a part of any belief system. For the Christian, it is important to recognize that we have a duty to God because of what we are: His creatures, made to live and act and choose according to His design for us. In order to see that something is good, we must see how it is good for us: not necessarily in a hedonistic sense, but by the sense in which our own existence and experience must itself have moral value in order for our choices regarding God’s created order to have real moral value in terms of our relation to it. This only illustrates more strongly the concept of our individual relation to the absolute, and our beautiful duty to a magnificent and holy, and loving God.
The last existential concept that has relevance in a Christian worldview which I would like to discuss is the movement of faith which Kierkegaard also discusses. In a universe which is, though not absurd, often outside of our complete understanding, we must make choices with best that we have. We do not create values by making these choices, but we do affirm them. By making the movement of faith in God and Jesus Christ, we show our belief in Him and our love by the internal movement we have made, which necessarily becomes manifest in our external actions.
Saturday, August 12, 2006
Sonnet 11
There he stood, against the blackened hills,
upon which grew a garden long decayed,
shaking in the constant, blowing chills,
facing death, to proud to be afraid.
Wanting what he fancied was his due,
his fist against the sealed storm clouds shook:
his lineage had left him much to rue,
though what he lacked, his own clenched hand had took.
The ground, though scorched, could testimony give
to Him who every substance has supplied,
but him who on it stood, aspiring to live,
rejected life; its very source, denied.
So there He stood against the blackened land,
a crimson nail driven through each hand.
@ 2006 Micah Carpenter
Most of my poems are a little more "flowery" than this stark, bleak, dim imagery. It seems to have a strange note of honesty about it, though. That's how I felt when I wrote it, at least.
upon which grew a garden long decayed,
shaking in the constant, blowing chills,
facing death, to proud to be afraid.
Wanting what he fancied was his due,
his fist against the sealed storm clouds shook:
his lineage had left him much to rue,
though what he lacked, his own clenched hand had took.
The ground, though scorched, could testimony give
to Him who every substance has supplied,
but him who on it stood, aspiring to live,
rejected life; its very source, denied.
So there He stood against the blackened land,
a crimson nail driven through each hand.
@ 2006 Micah Carpenter
Most of my poems are a little more "flowery" than this stark, bleak, dim imagery. It seems to have a strange note of honesty about it, though. That's how I felt when I wrote it, at least.
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