One might define a miricle as an event which happens apart from nature. In other words, it is some form of intervention by something that is outside of the closed system of the physical universe. Of course, a complete naturalist does not accept the possibility of miricles under this definition. However, there are probably more believers in miricles than there are believers in God. Every person who believes that he or she has free will (and there are some, although probably few, who do not) believes in miricles.
A false dichotomy is sometimes presented in which events are either determined or random. Free will is often categorized as the latter. But if a choice is random, is it really a choice? Isn't a choice a creation of a personal being?
It is somewhat ironic that many of the people who maintain that miricles do not exist are often the most active in working to manage and protect the environment. They do not recognize the possibility that a personal and rational being can create and interact with our world, while they do this very thing themselves on a smaller scale. Every choice we make is an event outside of nature. We all make miricles.
Monday, September 17, 2007
Monday, September 03, 2007
Argument from meaning
Every so often, an idea occurs to me which seems somewhat trite, but at the same time interesting enough that I feel some compulsion to put it down in words.
This one actually occured to me, if I recall correctly, in science class. I was thinking about about materialism, and about how it starts with pure impiricism, and draws only conclusions that can be reached by sheer impiricism. I have thought about this in the past in light of the epistemological short-sightedness of this methedology, and have picked the idea apart from the ground up. But why not approach it from the top down?
To start with, it might be speculated that any worldview (even nihilism) presupposes some kind of meaning. This can be held on the very personal grounds that nobody who completely lacked a concept of meaning and a desire to fullfill it would ever bother postulating an idea of any sort. Meaning is a psychological prerequisite to any kind of activity. Even those who are skepical of it's existence, find meaning in their self-appointed task of sharing their message of its non-existence with the world.
My basic question, however, is whether it makes as much sense to start with the apparently necessary assumption of meaning, as it does to start with the assumption that only the impirically observable exists. Although this statement will inevitbably be called such names as unscientific, I do not see where it is so fundamentally different from drawing conclusions from other seemingly undeniable aspects of human experience. We might state this proposition syllogistically as follows:
1. Raw matter cannot produce meaning.
2. Humans experience meaning.
3. Therefore, there is more than raw matter.
Of course, it is another matter to get from this to the idea of a God, let alone the God of Christianity. In fact, pantheists have reasonable, if skewed, grounds for explaining meaning. That view has a different set of problems.
This one actually occured to me, if I recall correctly, in science class. I was thinking about about materialism, and about how it starts with pure impiricism, and draws only conclusions that can be reached by sheer impiricism. I have thought about this in the past in light of the epistemological short-sightedness of this methedology, and have picked the idea apart from the ground up. But why not approach it from the top down?
To start with, it might be speculated that any worldview (even nihilism) presupposes some kind of meaning. This can be held on the very personal grounds that nobody who completely lacked a concept of meaning and a desire to fullfill it would ever bother postulating an idea of any sort. Meaning is a psychological prerequisite to any kind of activity. Even those who are skepical of it's existence, find meaning in their self-appointed task of sharing their message of its non-existence with the world.
My basic question, however, is whether it makes as much sense to start with the apparently necessary assumption of meaning, as it does to start with the assumption that only the impirically observable exists. Although this statement will inevitbably be called such names as unscientific, I do not see where it is so fundamentally different from drawing conclusions from other seemingly undeniable aspects of human experience. We might state this proposition syllogistically as follows:
1. Raw matter cannot produce meaning.
2. Humans experience meaning.
3. Therefore, there is more than raw matter.
Of course, it is another matter to get from this to the idea of a God, let alone the God of Christianity. In fact, pantheists have reasonable, if skewed, grounds for explaining meaning. That view has a different set of problems.
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