Coronary Stratification: layers of desire and the nature of will

The human heart, in terms of its capacity will and choice, is something that is almost universally acknowledged, yet when examined critically, is a matter of exceedingly great complication. I realized this to a greater degree just today while considering the source of the choices that we make. I have often done much of my thinking in this area from the assumption that our choices are simply extentions of our deepest feelings, convictions and desires. In this way, I proposed that choices are not things existing independantly, but are simply the outward expressions of personal ontology.

To some degree, I would continue to hold to this understanding of choice, particularly in regard to the belief that human choices are not the product of mere spontinity existing apart from prior experience or other factors which help form who we are as individuals. Yet when I began to consider the ramifications of the concept of human choice as pure extention of our most central and most deeply held desires, I ran into several difficulties.

The first difficulty was theological. It is my understanding of Scripture that God has given man a certain degree of volitional responsibility and desires us to respond to His promptings and initiatives as He enables us in regard to matters of saving faith and sanctification (as well as all aspects of life in which we are expected to make moral and responsible choices.) I realized that if the choice to belive in Christ as the spirit moves us is something derived from the totality of our internal state, then none of us, being fallen, would be able to choose thus. Moreover, this would imply that some of us (those who accept Christ) have a basic goodness from which they choose this, whereas those who don't accept Christ do so out of an inherent sinfulness. This not only contradicts the scriptural reality that all of us are sinful by nature, but it also reduces our theology to the entirely heretical possition that God effectively saves by merit of our own righteousness, rather than that of Christ.

The second difficulty that came to my mind regarding this theory of will is that of the objective observation that the choices I make are not universally made with respect to what I most deeply desire within myself. To make this most clear, it is most effective for me to refer to Paul's monologue in Romans in which he describes how he does the sinful things that he really does not want to do, and those things which he in is inmost being desires, fails to do. Perhaps it would be a fair assesment to say that the only people who don't identify with this are those who obsequiously conform their opinions to their actions, rather than seek to do the opposite. This led me to consider how we tend to make choices not so much out of the central core of our being, but out of whatever frame of mind is most present on the surface of our conciousness. From personal experience, I speculated on how the heart seems to have layers: there is the set of core beliefs and desires, above which lay many other desires and ideas, in layers of increasing or decreasing contingency. For example, if I were to go on a diet in which I have decided not to eat chocolate cake, the choice to do this would reflect a desire of comparitve importance and centrality. However, on a less central and more contingent level, I would more than likely feel an urgent desire to eat chocolate cake in the situation that I were offered a piece. The fact that I would want to make an effort to resist this desire, and would remember my original commitment to abstain, indicates that the central desire is still most central. But due to the present circumstance, it may cease to be as compelling on my momentary behavior, and I would be likely to give into my surface desire to indulge. My ability to stay true to my diet may well rest in my ability to maintain an appropriate relationship between my central desire and my immediate appitites. For it would seem that in fact one aspect of human will involves the interaction between our strata of desires and our consciousness, so that our consciousness gives particular respect to whatever leval within our heart. (Of course, we should also be careful to acknowlege that our will here also has its limits.)

Applied to the theology of human choice, this view seem to measure up better. I would hold that the Bible does not teach total depravity to the extent that man is so corrupt as to be utterly unable to even think or desire anything a single aspect of which is good. In fact, it seems to frequently imply the contrary in refrence to particular individuals in the old testiment who could not be considered saved, but were viewed as righteous (consider Noah, or Abraham before he was called by God: in fact, God seemed to single both out as righteous individuals, although they were certainly members of fallen humanity.) With this in mind, I think it is entirely reasonable to suppose that at some leval, each of us has a desire for God and to submit to Him, sinse this is just that for which we were made. This desire, although indicitive of some essential value which mankind has, certainly does not make him morally good or worthy of justification. Therefore, when someone chooses to acknowlege Christ as savior, he or she is not expressing any inherent goodness from which that choice was created. The choice is not so much an outpouring of an original sentiment belonging to the totality of his or her being, but is rather the selection of a particular possible reaction to the prompting of the Spirit. Morally, it is really very difficult to speak on the condition of the center of man's heart: one could well argue that it is to acknowlege God, because this is what he was made for and is a longing that, whether he realizes it or not, cannot be removed from him, or that it is evil, because each of us apart from Christ beligerently clings to a love of self-rule and self-determination of what is right. In either case, we are inherently sinful and in deep need of God's redemptive action in our lives. And so it is not that there are the certain righteous individuals who so desire God that they choose him and are saved, and others are predomintated by sin and refuse. All are predominated by sin, and all alike have a desire for God. It is then when an individual choses to submit to the desire for God that has been instilled in him and the divine initive which activates it that saving faith is enabled, and when a person of equal internal condition chooses to deny it that he rejects God's salvation. In a remote sense, one might say that the one was more righteous than the other, because the one choice is simply superior to the other, but it is not in any way by virtue of any such righteousness that one is considered worthy of salvation, for that is out of the question altogether. God does not save those whom he deems more righteous, but simply those who will be saved.

Having said all of this, I feel to make some further remarks regarding human choice that in some way recognizes some important considerations within my initial model of human choice which, on the whole, proved in need of revision. That is the sense in which human choice to some extent may be part of the way in which we are image bearers of God, not only in simply having this capicity, but in making choices we reflect God's creative power and the law of His spoken word. Humans cannot create matter out of nothing, like God can, (only rearrange it, and that in a limited fashion) but when we choose something, we have in a certain sense created something out of nothing. It is not as though our choices are uninfluenced; on the contrary, nearly every choice we make seems to involve certain persuasions, past experiences, or predispositions. However, it is not these that do the choosing, they are only the material employed in making the choice. From whence does the choice itself derive? It might be said to purely random, but that is to say that it has no contingencies whatsoever, which is not only metaphysically impossible within the terms being dealt with, but is in fact contrary to the fact that it is a choice. To say that something is a choice is not to say that is dependant upon nothing, but that it is ultimately dependant on and deriving from the one choosing. In other words, a choice is an ex nihilo creation of the will. But just as God's act of creating is both ex nihilo and a result of his Character whereby He determines certain things to be good, so our choices, in themselves creations out of nothing, are results of various factors within us, and (in this case unlike God) external influence. (As a side note, I think that the science of psychology has been able to tell us much of how our choices can both be influeced and free; maybe this deserves another post sometime.) In this way, we bear God's image as one who creates by His spoken word acting as ultimate law. The whole underlying philosohpy here also deserves further explaination, but it should suffice to say that we might consider God to be the only being who is Himself a perfect union of substance and law; in all other cases, law is that universal which acts upon substantial particulars, but God is in Himself law through His will; that is, His word whereby He spoke all matter into being. In a far lesser sense, humans reflect some of this union between substantial, particular existence and law, for human choices are, in an exceedingly diminutive sense, a formal cause to ceratin events, and thus a type of law within a particular sphere.

Of course, one must recognize the the qualitative, as well as quantitative, differences between human and divine acts of creation. To illustrate this, it should be pointed out that the very material, both as form and as substance, upon which our choosing is dependent is the creation of God. Our creations, though original in their own right as particulars, are mere rearrangments of substances and forms which only God can create. In the sense previously described, our very acts of choosing, which themselves require both formal (the range of possible options to choose from) and substantial (our experiences, predispositions, motivations, and external influences) material for choice, do show the kind of something-out-of-nothing choice by producing a result that is niether random, nor predisposed. Although predictable, and not necessarily particularly creative, it is new, and the product of a human being. That much being said, there are the obvious differences between humans demonstrating formal word-as-law and that of God, such as the fact that only God can create physical matter, and that like wise such "law" which constitutes the essense of human choice and creativity has no power whatsoever beyond the forms within the thinker's mind. As in all things, choice at once illuminates God's image in us, and illustrates His transcendent and infinite nature that is wholly incomensurate with humanity.

I must conclude this tediously long post by stating the most obviously speculative nature of these ideas. I in no way mean to be dogmatic; these are at very best the musings of one aspiring to be a philosopher, and at worst, the ravings of an eccentric fool. I hope the former in time proves nearer the case, and that my ramblings, if not flawless, will in some sense be helpful.